Ri Il Hwan, where you at?

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Workers’ Party of Korea [WPK] Secretary Ri Il Hwan (Ri Il-hwan) has not appeared at public events or state media in about four weeks.  This is not necessarily a lengthy absence for a North Korean elite and sometimes putting out an APB can be an unproductive use of time.   However, Ri is a front facing senior official with his Secretariat portfolio including DPRK press and culture.  As the regime’s top propaganda official, keeping up appearances is part of the job description.

To assess Ri Il Hwan’s absence and test some assumptions we need to compare it to one of his peers in the Secretariat and place it in the context of the public activity of two of his predecessors who held the PAD portfolio.   The last WPK Secretary with the same portfolio to face disciplinary sanction was Jong Ha Chol (Cho’ng Ha-ch’ol) during the early 2000s.  We need to attain a general reason for Ri’s absence—is it for personal or professional reasons?  If related to his job, is it to expand his authority as a core elite or has Ri been sidelined or punished?

Ri Il Hwan’s last observed appearance was on New Year’s Day when he joined other senior party officials at Ku’msusan Palace of the Sun in paying respect to the late DPRK leaders.  Ri failed to attend the Secretariat meeting on 27 January and he did not attend the Supreme People’s Assembly [SPA] session on 22 and 23 January.  At the opening of local production units in Chaeryong County and the funeral for a major DPRK songwriter and bandleader WPK Propaganda and Agitation Director Ju Chang Il (Chu Chang-il) spoke.

Ri Il Hwan has not appeared in public in 44 days.

We might contrast Ri’s absence with that of WPK Secretary of Military Affairs MAR Pak Jong Chon (Pak Cho’ng-chon) between October and November 2024.  Pak was out of the public eye for 43 days, joining Kim Jong Un (KJU; Kim Cho’ng-u’n) for a field inspection of the II Army Corps HQ element on 17 October 2024 and then resurfacing on 29 November 2024 for a visit by the Russian Minister of Defense.

On the one hand, MAR Pak has gone to ground and resurfaced on at least two occasions.  On the other, if we use a bit of landscape analysis, between October and November 2024 North Korea was executing its largest military deployment since the Vietnam War and its largest troop deployment in its history.

As the responsible official for civilian control over DPRK military affairs, it is highly probable Pak was directly supervising the KPA’s deployment from the North Korean side.  Add to that Pak Jong Chon was responsible for the preparations of the Russian defense ministerial visit including briefing KJU and organizing events when the minister was on the ground in Pyongyang.  In the words of Dick Cheney, Pak “had more important things to do” than attending public events.

The WPK Secretary with the PAD portfolio serves as a surrogate for the Suryo’ng and other core elites who cannot attend public events.This was the case for the late Kim Ki Nam who waved the core leadership banner at numerous events.  In the days when late leader Kim Jong Il (KJI; Kim Cho’ng-ok) could not make a public appearance, Kim Ki Nam was sent into speak on his behalf.  When Pak Kwang Ho (Pak Kwang-ho), successor to Kim Ki Nam, experienced ill health in 2018, Kim Ki Nam came out of retirement to replace Pak.

In assessing Ri Il Hwan’s absence, there could be a personal reason for his not attending events.   Of course, the only personal reason a North Korean elites would be exempt from not maintaining a public profile are health problems.   DPRK political culture has an ample history of keeping senior officials in office and at public events despite ailing health.  Unless they’re in palliative care, a senior official can sit on a platform at events like a SPA session or Secretariat meeting.   If Ri has health problems which have sidelined him from participating in events, then he might be receiving medical treatment and recovering in a foreign country.  As a top elite with ties to both KJI and KJU, Ri would certainly qualify for that special favor (and, of course, expected to jot down a testimonial).

Ri’s absence is more likely tied to his job.   It is not necessarily all doom ‘n’ gloom.   Ri may have been sent to the Higher Party School for a six-to-eight week course. This could be a punitive measure, but under KJU senior officials are sent away to prepare them for a new position or additional job responsibilities.   Senior military officials are routinely sent to one of several institutions for debriefing and education between command positions.  If Ri Il Hwan has been sent to the Higher Party School, then he is either at the tail end or halfway through his term.  If he was sent down as a punishment he might have to prove himself to return to high office.

If Ri has been sent to the Higher Party School as punishment then it means he is suspended from office.  As the WPK Secretary there are several areas Ri Il Hwan could trespass that might endanger his career.

There are a couple of caveats.  First, as a member of the Secretariat Ri is less involved in the day to day operational management of North Korean press and news, state censorship organizations (the Publication Guidance Bureau, the Central Broadcasting Commission) and the DPRK’s culture and arts than the PAD Director, Ju Chang Il.   Second, Ri would be expected to assume responsibility for any number of scandals under his purview because, as a member of the Secretariat, he did not provide sufficient guidance to his underlings.

From the perspective of his position, there are several areas PAD manages in which Ri Il Hwan could find himself suspended from office or even worse.  As mentioned briefly above, this does not mean Ri has direct involvement.  Rather, it would involve guidance issued to PAD personnel and relevant institutions, slipshod reporting to the Central Committee and/or KJU, or being compelled to accept responsibility either for PAD personnel or cadres with ties to Ri Il Hwan through patronage or elite social networks.

The first general area involves state control over information and culture.   PAD also formulates and disseminates ideological indoctrination and political education materials.  Ri may have approved materials that conflicted with prevailing ideological trends.  He may have taken a lighter hand on foreign and decadent content as part of PAD’s participation with State Security, OGD and other agencies (Group 109 and what not) in enforcing bans on unsanctioned foreign media content.   Of course this bit of speculation doesn’t delve into news reporting or how official DPRK communique are rendered in state media.

Part of PAD control also involves what themes, motifs or expressions are used in DPRK books, movies, music and television programming.   DPRK cultural products have attempted to integrate expression from outside cultural works which are popular with DPRK citizens.  One example of this was that KCTV aired a show based on the US sitcom (ye gods!) Friends.  Considering that the jangmadeng still offers bootlegs of Disney flicks, it was probably not the offerings of the American imperialist bastards which would cause offense.  Maybe things are looking, sounding and feeling a tad too Southern.  The DPRK is not immune to the Hallyu wave so anything that looks or sounds like it came from ROK would contravene standards and practices which PAD enforces.

There could be a whole separate scandal which has sidelined Ri Il Hwan.  He might have a personal scandal or may have engaged in corrupt activities.  As a top North Korean elite, Ri can help family members and personal friends attain jobs or help them in their business activity.  Former Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho (Ri Yo’ng-ho) was removed from office and sent away because his family members were trading on his name and political offices for their own financial benefit.  If another official in PAD or elsewhere in the regime is part of Ri’s social network, or if Ri served as a reference or their benefactor, then he might be held responsible for their behavior.

At the Secretariat meeting where Ri was absent, one of the incidents detailed was a drinking “spree” at Onch’o’n/Yonggang Hot Springs.   State media reporting about that incident could have omitted Ri Il Hwan’s connection to that event or the officials involved.  The wayward county party chief secretary could have patronage ties to Ri or may have assumed Ri would be able to bail him out.

KJU may not have decided what to do about Ri Il Hwan.  Ri has not attended any cultural events marking the Day of the Shining Star (KJI’s birthday).  On the other hand, if Ri is at the Higher Party School or under suspension it is still early innings. Perhaps Ri Il Hwan will resurface on 16 February or, failing that, the April holidays.